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ALBERT TATE, JR.: JUDGE, JURIST AND THE
BARBER IN VILLE PLATTE-
Richard C. Stanley* &
Calvin P. Brasseaux*
With hair askew and pipe clenched tightly in his teeth, wearing his
green banker's visor and favorite blue sweater, Al Tate was a constant
threat to burst into the office of one of his law clerks with new analytical
approaches to pending cases. The judge, the case and his ideas, rarely
in any distinguishable order, would roll into the room and depart as
suddenly as they had come, but with the definite impression that justice
was in the making. Sorting out just what had happened after Judge
Tate left the room was part of the mechanics of being his law clerk.
Capturing and applying the judge's genius to disputes before the court
were the art of the job.
Law clerks are privileged witnesses of the judicial process. They see
how issues in a case appear and disappear, how they gain priority, and
how they come to be resolved. In most instances, they also see how a
judge works within this process and within the law to achieve a just
result. Law clerks are therefore privy to some of the secrets of those
who are the primary actors in the judicial process. Judge Tate left his
law clerks with a distinct picture of his approach to judging cases and
achieving correct and fair results. Only a very poor witness would fail
to see the judge's passion for the law or his philosophy for deciding
cases. His primary work was the careful application of existing law to
decide most of the disputes before the court; only secondarily did he
assume the more celebrated role of jurist interpreting and expanding
the law. Judge Tate undertook both tasks, however, with a zeal for
justice and fairness to the common man. As he would ask when debating
an issue, "But what would the barber in Ville Platte say about that?"
We cannot in these few pages give the reader more than a glimpse
of Albert Tate, Jr. as judge and jurist. We can, however, draw upon
our observations as law clerks to Judge Tate while he served on the
United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and offer some perspectives
on the work of this fine judge and the principles that formed his sense
of justice. In particular, Judge Tate brought with him to the Fifth
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Circuit two legacies from his years on the Louisiana appellate courts:
a healthy regard for the rights of the common man and a passion for
Louisiana law. Although his judicial philosophy did not always permit
him to express his views on these matters, the judge found proper
forums in which he could assume the role of jurist that he had exercised
more freely on the Louisiana Supreme Court.
In the paragraphs that follow, we describe briefly Judge Tate's views
on the proper role of an appellate judge. Judge Tate's judicial philosophy
helps explain both why he spoke out when he did and the principles
that affected what he said. With this framework established, we examine
a few of Judge Tate's opinions as a Fifth Circuit judge concerning two
of his most passionate concerns-the rights of the common man and
Louisiana law-and, if we are lucky, catch a look at the jurist at work.
I. WHEN TO JUDGE
Perhaps the most misconceived notion about Judge Tate is that he
took too expansive a view of his role as jurist and sought out oppor-
tunities to legislate from the bench. The opposite is true. Judge Tate
accepted as his primary and often exclusive role that of the judge deciding
the dispute put to the court according to well-accepted principles of
law. Early in his judicial career, the judge expressed his view that all
but a few cases could be decided by application of precedent and logic.,
Only those few remaining cases called for the application of other
principles:
Although a great preponderance of an appellate judge's case-
load-perhaps 90 or 95076 or more-similarly involves routine
application of precedent and word-logic, fairly soon in the life
of the new judge the moment comes when he realizes that there
are some cases in which he (or no one) can find "the" law-
that is, legislative enactments or sufficiently related decisions by
his own or other courts that definitely indicate which of two
contrary reasonable positions should have favorable judgment
upon the facts found to be correct.2
That Judge Tate served for the majority of his career as an appellate
judge in Louisiana, in which, pursuant to civilian methodology, prec-
edents are in theory "regarded only as an interpretation[s] of the law
(i.e., of legislation)"3 and not as establishing binding rules of law, did
1. Tate, "Policy" in Judicial Decisions, 20 La. L. Rev. 62 (1959) (hereinafter
"Policy").
2. Id. at 62 (footnotes omitted).
3. Tate, Techniques of Judicial Interpretation in Louisiana, 22 La. L. Rev. 727,
743-44 (1962) (emphasis omitted). See also Tate, Civilian Methodology in Louisiana, 44
Tul. L. Rev. 673 (1970).
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not change his view that all but a few cases could be decided by precedent
and logic. He noted that "in actual practice, Louisiana judges do not
lightly disregard a settled line of precedents, even though in theory they
are free to do so." 4 Indeed, Judge Tate felt "morally bound," as a
Louisiana judge, "to honor a higher court precedent containing a con-
sidered holding squarely and clearly applicable to the conflict" at issue.,
Of course, he also felt that "a lower court is not required to apply
mechanically precedents of higher courts which were never intended to
supply a principle for the distinguishable type of conflict now before
the lower court." 6
Only when a judge was adrift without controlling precedent, there-
fore, did Judge Tate advocate the use of "policy considerations" to
decide a case. These "policy considerations" were defined functionally
as "what is best for the community as a precedent and ... what
impresses [the judge] as the fair solution of the question for the parties
concerned." ' 7 According to Judge Tate, the obvious dangers of policy
choices being made in cases by judges with "[i]ndividualistic and non-
representative views" generally were offset by the availability of further
appellate review and the use of multi-judge panels." Failing all else, the
application of policy in judicial decision-making was held in check by
the necessity for sound legal reasoning, As Judge Tate aptly observed:
[W]hatever part policy may play in the decisional process, the
final product as expressed by the rendered opinion must use
normal legal reasoning; for unlike the mistakes of physicians
which according to the popular saying are buried, those of
appellate judges are published and perpetuated and, if unsound,
soon fall prey to higher courts or the critical pens of the law
reviews or both.9
As his enunciation of these principles demonstrates, Judge Tate
believed that the use of policy considerations to decide cases was properly
limited to a certain class of cases and further restricted in application
by collegial and supervisory review and sound legal reasoning. Judge
Tate said it better:
[J]udges do not and should not dispense justice simply according
to their individual notions of what is fair for the individuals
concerned, or of what will in the future provide a sensible rule
4. Tate, Techniques of Judicial Interpretation in Louisiana, 22 La. L. Rev. 727,
747 (1962).
5. Id. at 751.
6. Id. at 750-51.
7. Policy, supra note 1, at 63.




for the community. The justice they attempt to render must be
accomplished within the framework of their judicial system and
subject to the discipline of the judicial craft, which permits
discretionary judicial choice only in the absence of legislative
policy or of prior binding precedent or of a clear answer to
the present litigation deduced either from legislative provisions
or prior precedent or both. These observations concerning policy
considerations as a factor in judicial decisions should be read
as subject to such qualification. 0
Judge Tate's judicial philosophy, therefore, presents a limited view
of the role of a judge as jurist. "Policy" considerations, defined as the
best precedent for the community and the fairest resolution of the dispute
for the parties, are only to be applied when no settled rule decides the
case, and then only according to accepted principles of sound legal
reasoning. Even those with strict views of the policy-making function
of judges must concede that judges are called upon at times to decide
cases in which no precedent governs. In such circumstances, few could
disagree that principles similar to those articulated by Judge Tate should
apply to ensure cautious employment of policy considerations.
This review of Judge Tate's judicial philosophy renders curious the
charge that the judge took an expansive view of his juristic role. Those
who make this charge perhaps misread Judge Tate's candor in his
decisions as evidence of a liberal view towards judicial policy-making.
As clearly as he stated his views of when a judge permissibly could act
as jurist, Judge Tate clearly identified the policy considerations at work
in those opinions in which he himself assumed that role. Such an
approach may be regarded as rare, for it is not uncommon for judges
to hide their actions as jurists and thereby conceal the policy consid-
erations that in fact shape their decisions. Citation of factually distin-
guishable precedent as binding authority, omission of discussion of
contrary authority and misapplication of precedent are familiar devices
employed in opinion writing to obscure the lack of true precedent and,
therefore, the fact that the decision makes a policy choice in circum-
stances previously unaddressed by the court. Judge Tate's open approach,
while sometimes prone to draw criticism, at least allowed for clear
identification of the reasoning supporting the policy choices made and
permitted collegial and supervisory review of those choices. Without
close study, critics could confuse such openness with an expansive view
of the juristic role of the judge. Judge Tate, however, was true to his
judicial philosophy. Though he held strong views on issues affecting the
rights of the common man, the judge exercised his prerogative to speak
out as jurist only in carefully selected cases.
10. Id. at 68-69.
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II. ADVICE IN DISSENT
One forum on the Fifth Circuit that permitted Judge Tate to express
his concerns as jurist was in dissenting opinions. A dissent affords a
judge an opportunity to express individual views since the judge is freed
from the responsibilities of delivering the opinion of the court and of
rendering an opinion acceptable to other members of a collegial panel.
The subject matters of a judge's dissents are also matters of interest,
since an overworked judge with a consistently heavy caseload cannot
afford to spend valuable hours drafting opinions that do not decide
cases. Judges, therefore, tend to select their dissents carefully and on
issues of fundamental concern to them. For these reasons, dissents reflect
both the types of issues a judge finds important and the judge's views
on those issues.
A great number of Judge Tate's dissents occurred in cases where
policy choices had been made, or precedents questionably applied, to
deny basic rights to individuals. In the few selected dissents discussed
below, Judge Tate assumed the role of jurist to advocate against intrusive
searches of persons of Hispanic descent, the denial of naturalization to
homosexuals and the arbitrary limitation of recovery to a victim of an
air crash disaster. Though not always invoking the most popular cause,
the judge's dissents demonstrate his steadfast refusal, consistent with his
judicial philosophy, to sanction perceived injustices to the common man.
In United States v. Garcia,1 the court was asked to review the
constitutionality of a stop and search of the defendant's vehicle about
115 miles from the Mexican border. The facts surrounding the stop were
not disputed. At 11:30 in the evening, two agents in a roving border
patrol car spotted a pick-up truck with a camper attachment traveling
north on Interstate 35. The agents observed that the truck appeared to
be heavily loaded, that it was traveling slowly and that the windows of
the camper shell were fogged over. The agents pulled alongside the truck
and shined their flashlight into the cabin. They observed three women
in the front seat and five or six men in the back seat. The agents
testified that the clothes and hair of the men appeared dirty and unkempt.
The agents stopped the vehicle and found that it contained a number
of Mexican citizens without immigration papers.
In a case such as Garcia, it is sometimes easy for a court to permit
an agent's successful guess that a vehicle contained illegal aliens to
justify the search. But this overlooks a grave danger and threat to the
rights of law-abiding Hispanic citizens. Had the agents stopped the
vehicle and discovered no illegal aliens after searching the vehicle and
its occupants, no arrests would have been made and no issue presented
11. 732 F.2d 1221 (5th Cir. 1984).
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to the court, although the Hispanic citizens would have been the object
of an equally intrusive search and detention. The propriety of a stop
and search, therefore, must be considered apart from its results, since
a court generally will not review the cases in which bad guesses were
made.
Judge Tate's dissent in Garcia was prompted in part by the majority's
failure to apply with consistency prior decisions of the Fifth Circuit.
As the dissent pointed out, the court previously had refused to give any
weight to several of the factors relied upon by the majority in upholding
a search when a vehicle is stopped as far from the border as in Garcia.
Indeed, prior decisions had not given weight to the heavy load factor,
the hunkering down of a vehicle's passengers, the reaction of passengers
to the shining of a flashlight, or the lateness of the hour of travel.
Careful parsing of the facts showed that only three factors relied upon
by the agents could support the reasonableness of their conduct: their
previous experience with illegal alien traffic on the highway, the type
of vehicle, and the unkempt appearances of the passengers. And, of
these three factors, Judge Tate determined that the controlling one had
to be the "appearances" of the truck's occupants:
That the highway on which Garcia was stopped and that the
type of truck she was driving are commonly used for the smug-
gling of aliens must be insufficient, standing alone, to support
reasonable suspicion for a stop, unless, of course, we are willing
to permit all vehicles commonly used for smuggling (of which
there are an increasing number) to be stopped at any distance
over 115 miles from the border on designated highways-subject
only to the discretion and availability of border patrol agents.
The controlling factor in this case, if the stop was lawful, must
be the unkempt appearances of the truck's occupants, which is
alleged to be consistent with the appearance of illegal aliens. In
short, we must rely on the ability of a border patrol agent to
discern whether the appearance of the Hispanic occupants of a
given vehicle are more or less like that of the typical illegal
alien, rather than that of any other poor and disheveled Amer-
ican of Hispanic descent.12
This passage best explains the basis for Judge Tate's dissent. It was
inconceivable to Judge Tate that a person's appearance as disheveled
or unkempt could be a controlling factor in the constitutionality of a
stop and search, especially when such an assessment is essentially sub-
jective in nature:
12. Id. at 1232 (Tate, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 471016
ALBERT TATE, JR.
Whether a person appears "dirty" or "unkempt" varies greatly
with the subjective perceptions of the person making the as-
sessment. The standard will differ with each agent's experience
and attitude about the typical appearance of an illegal alien.
While I concede that this factor is worthy of some consideration,
I cannot contribute controlling weight-in the sense of the con-
stitutionality of a stop-to the hygienic appearances of a vehicle's
occupants as interpreted by border patrol agents. 3
A motivating factor in this dissent, therefore, was the apparent
approval by the majority of the use of a dirty appearance as a controlling
factor in justifying a stop. The occupants of this truck easily could
have been a group of field hands returning from work. Because of the
great distance from the border, no legitimate inference could be drawn
that these people had illegally entered the United States. The decisional
authority prior to Garcia had not authorized a stop in such circum-
stances, thus positing for the court a clear choice between conflicting
policies. Should the power of border patrols to stop persons be increased
in light of the growing number of illegal aliens entering the country,
or should persons of Hispanic descent be saved from intrusive stops
and detention far from the border based upon subjective assessments
of border patrol agents? Presented with this choice, Judge Tate would
protect the otherwise unprotected little man-and so he stated:
Differentiating the United States from police states of past his-
tory and the present, our Constitution in its Fourth Amendment
prohibition against unreasonable searches protects all our resi-
dents, whether middle-class and well-dressed or poor and dish-
eveled, from arbitrary stop by governmental enforcement agents
in our travel upon the highways of this nation.
The perceived social problem in controlling the hordes of
illegal migrants from Mexico, does not, in my opinion, justify
stopping people of Hispanic-descent appearance far from the
border, 'simply because the hour is late and they appear to be
poor and dirty working people, any more than it would justify
the similar arbitrary stop of any native-born or naturalized Amer-
ican simply because he has the same characteristics of appear-
ance.14
To Judge Tate, the disrespect attendant to a stop and search based
upon ancestry and appearance and the damage that such stops would
do to our basic constitutional freedoms as individuals simply outweighed
the need to accord further powers to border patrol enforcement officers.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1229 (Tate, J., dissenting).
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Consistent with his judicial philosophy, however, this policy choice was
identified and clearly expressed rather than hidden in some doubtful
application of precedent.
Judge Tate expressed a similar regard for individual freedoms in
his dissent in Matter of Longstaff.5 The facts in this case are somewhat
peculiar. Longstaff, a native and citizen of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, was admitted to the United States in 1965
as a permanent resident. He settled in Texas, where he successfully
established himself in a business under the tradename Union Jack. In
1980, Longstaff applied for naturalization as a citizen of the United
States. Despite a finding by the examiner that he was of good moral
character, Longstaff was denied naturalization because he admitted that
he had engaged in homosexual activity before entering the United States
in 1965. According to the relevant statutory framework, a person could
be denied naturalization if he had not been "lawfully admitted" at the
time of entry into the United States. At the time Longstaff entered the
United States, Congress had listed "psychopathic personality" and "sex-
ual deviation," interpreted to include homosexuality, as causes for ex-
clusion in a list of seven medical bases for exclusion.1 6 The statutory
framework further required that a physician, either a medical officer of
the Public Health Service or a civil surgeon employed by the United
States, conduct an examination of an alien suspected of being medically
excludable and certify in a medical certificate that a medical cause for
exclusion existed.
Although the statutory framework was relatively clear, the real prob-
lem posed to the court had yet another source. At the time Longstaff
applied for naturalization, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
could not obtain medical certification of homosexuality from the Public
Health Service. Since 1979, pursuant to an order by the Surgeon General,
the Public Health Service has refused medically to diagnose and certify
that an individual was a homosexual. In Longstaff's case, therefore, no
medical certificate existed certifying his homosexuality. The Immigration
and Naturalization Service relied instead on Longstaff's candid admission
about his homosexuality prior to entering the United States.
In resolving this delicate problem, the majority reasoned that Longs-
taff's admissions about this homosexuality should be construed as suf-
ficient for a finding that he was medically excludable at the time he
entered the United States. The majority stated:
To remand the case for a medical determination of homosex-
uality would appear to be to ask for a certification of the
obvious. It is patent that sexual preference cannot be determined
15. 716 F.2d 1439 (5th Cir. 1983).
16. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a).
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by blood test or physical examination; even doctors must reach
a decision by interrogation of the person involved or of others
professing knowledge about that person. To require the INS to
disregard the most reliable source~of information, the statements
of the person involved, would be to substitute secondary evidence
for primary. 7
In his dissent, Judge Tate took issue with the majority's willingness
to alter the statutory framework to deny Longstaff's petition for nat-
uralization. Indeed, the reason for the majority's departure from the
plain statutory requirement of medical certification stemmed largely from
the difficulty of obtaining medical certification of homosexuality. As
Judge Tate pointed out, the fact that the Public Health Service refused
medically to certify someone as a homosexual hardly justified permitting
the Immigration and Naturalization Service to rely on lesser evidence
to exclude a person for that "medical" reason:
It is basic ... that this court is without authority to ignore the
mandate of Congress' statutory scheme merely because there is
an interagency dispute over the mechanics of statutory enforce-
ment. If this administrative dispute renders the exclusion of
homosexuals under the statute ineffective, then it is for Congress,
not this court, to alter its statutory scheme requiring medical
certification. Absent such congressional intervention, I am un-
willing to infer that Congress intended to allow the non-medical
personnel of an administrative agency to use "medical" clas-
sifications-as is the practice in present day Russia-to exile
persons for newly-discovered mental defects or other "medical
conditions."'"
In Longstaff, therefore, the court was presented with yet another
policy choice. Strictly applied, the statutory framework did not provide
for Longstaff's exclusion from the United States without a medical
certificate certifying his homosexuality. Because such certification had
become difficult, if not impossible, to obtain, the court was faced with
the choice of altering the statutory requirement to permit a finding of
homosexuality based upon bureaucratic interrogation or refusing to ex-
tend bureaucratic powers to exclude persons for medical reasons without
direct congressional intervention. Allowing non-medical personnel to find
"medical conditions," which loosely includes such conditions as "mental
defects," could lead to significant abuse of the rights of individuals
who could otherwise lawfully enter the United States. As Judge Tate
wrote:
17. Longstaff, 716 F.2d at 1448.
18. Id. at 1453 (Tate, J., dissenting).
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Of far greater importance than Longstaff's unfortunate in-
dividual plight, and the rather simple factual issues presented
by it, is the subjection to deportation of all other persons against
whom a governmental agency may assert as a reason for de-
portation-perhaps (as in the case of Longstaff) many years
after presumably lawful entry into the United States-a newly
discovered pre-admission "medical" cause for exclusion from
entry.
This spectre, and the avoidance of the possibility of abusive
bureaucratic deportation powers, is what I believe the Congress
intended to avoid by conclusively fixing a professionally certified
medical cause for exclusion from lawful admission .... 19
Longstaff provides not only an example of Judge Tate's concern
for the individual, but also a living application of his judicial philosophy.
The majority could have decided Longstaff's appeal on the basis of the
clearly articulated statutory framework. Nonetheless, it chose for policy
reasons to depart from Congress' legislative expression by permitting
exclusion for homosexuality without medical certification. As the struc-
ture of Judge Tate's dissent demonstrates, the error is twofold. Not
only should no policy choice have been made, since clear legislative
expression determined the result, but the policy choice adopted by the
majority is a dangerous one indeed, since it permits non-medical bu-
reaucratic personnel to make medical assessments of "psychopathic per-
sonality" and "mental defect" without congressional authorization. To
the judge, this was a high price to pay for the denial of Longstaff's
naturalization.
The majority of the court in In Re Aircraft Disaster near New
Orleans, Louisiana on July 9, 198220 also drew a vehement dissent from
Judge Tate, in this instance for their reduction of a damage award to
the plaintiff inconsistent with proper standards of federal appellate re-
view. The issues in this case revolved around the recovery by the plaintiff
for the death of his wife and all three of his children when a Pan
American jetliner crashed into and destroyed his home. The majority
reduced the plaintiff's recovery for the loss of his wife from $1,000,000
to $500,000, and for the loss of his three minor children from $400,000
to $250,000 each.
As Judge Tate pointed out in his dissent, the federal standard of
appellate review of damage awards for excessiveness is extremely limited.
19. Id. at 1453-54.
20. 767 F.2d 1151.(5th Cir. 1985).
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Citing substantial authority, Judge Tate reminded the majority that the
size of an award is essentially a question of fact not to be disturbed
absent a clear abuse of discretion. 21
Judge Tate's central attack, however, focused upon the majority's
apparent willingness to look to jury awards in other cases to reduce
this plaintiff's recovery, all without proper legal basis. Judge Tate wrote:
In shorthand terms, the fundamental error of the majority is
its failure to recognize that, as a threshold matter, the award
of damages is essentially a factual determination by the trier of
fact under the particularized facts of each case-not a matter
that on appellate review is to be scaled as allowable by a trier
of fact only by the use of numbers derived from prior appellate
approval of awards for losses of wives and children that were
made under varying factual conditions; not as if the loss of a
wife or the loss of a child represents some kind of a fungible
loss to be measured interchangeably, so that the loss of any
wife is the same as the loss of any other wife under all cir-
cumstances .22
Again, Judge Tate's criticism of the majority was two-fold. Not
only were policy considerations about the size of jury awards unneces-
sarily taken into account, these considerations were applied to reduce
the recovery by an individual who had suffered an immeasurable loss
at the hands of ihe defendant. To Judge Tate, it was not the size of
the jury award that was shocking or without basis in the record, it was
the majority's willingness to bypass appropriate standards of appellate
review:
[I]n my view the panel departs from [established principles of
appellate review] with but cursory reference, in determining that
the present awards were excessive without first examining and
explaining why our judicial conscience should be shocked, or
why these awards "clearly exceed the amount that any reasonable
man could feel the claimant is entitled to," Bridges, supra, 553
F.2d at 880. It seems to me that we cannot do so without
examination of the particular facts before us, when in a few
short seconds the tortious act of the defendant killed the claim-
ant's wife and three little boys, the center of the claimant's life,
and the focus of his hopes, ambitions, and happiness, and
destroyed through his grief at this loss his reason for being,
under record evidence reasonably accepted by the trial jury. I
21. Id. at 1161-62 (Tate, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 1160.
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simply cannot say that this award is manifestly excessive under
its facts.2 1
Although the limitation of jury awards is a much debated social
and legal issue, current standards of federal appellate review do not
permit the reduction or increase of jury awards based upon the vicis-
situdes of public opinion as to their magnitude. Had In Re Air Crash
presented facts in which a policy choice could have been made, such
as in Garcia, perhaps such considerations would have been relevant.
Even then, however, Judge Tate would have found it difficult to weigh
the interests of corporations and their insurers in limiting the damages
caused by their negligence against an individual's loss of his family and
dreams. As Judge Tate pointed out, however, that issue did not need
to be reached, since established precedents should have foreclosed the
consideration of the amount of a jury award amply supported by record
evidence.
Much has been said in the preceding pages about Judge Tate's
judicial philosophy and his unwillingness to join majority opinions that
prematurely resorted to policy considerations, as in Longstaff or In Re
Air Crash, or that made policy choices that appeared contrary to the
interests of the individual, as in Garcia. In all three instances, however,
Judge Tate was the champion of the individual laboring against the
government or other large interests. A cursory review of these decisions
could lead to the criticism that Judge Tate blindly chose to defend the
common man in every instance. That criticism, however, would be both
incorrect and unfair. It was not by blind choice, but rather by adherence
to his judicial philosophy, that the judge reached the conclusions that
he did. Admittedly, that philosophy led him to results which favored
the common man in each of these cases. This is not, however, due to
the inherent nature of that philosophy but to the facts of those cases
and the applicable statutes and precedents. In other cases, that philosophy
led Judge Tate as the author of a majority opinion to deny relief to
individuals with whose plight he nonetheless sympathized.
In Ramirez v. Rueles24 a group of migrant agricultural workers
brought an action against the members of a state employment services
agency seeking relief for wrongs they had suffered in connection with
their recruitment in Texas for employment in Delaware. The plaintiffs
suffered severely inhumane conditions on their journey to Delaware and
were subjected to substandard living conditions at the Delaware job site.
They sought relief under the Wagner-Peyser Act 25 on the grounds that
23. Id. at 1162 (citation omitted) (quoting Bridges v. Groendyke Transp., Inc., 553
F.2d 877, 880 (5th Cir. 1977)).
24. 736 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1984).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 49 (1973).
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the wrongs they had suffered violated the objectives of this statute and
its regulatory progeny. Although it could not be disputed that the
plaintiffs had been mistreated by the defendants, or that the defendants
had fallen far short of fulfilling the duties imposed upon them by the
applicable statutes and regulations, Judge Tate was constrained to find
that the plaintiffs could not recover for these wrongs under any existing
authority. As the Judge noted in the majority opinion:
The procedures through which [the] truck was authorized for
use as a vehicle to transport migrant workers concededly did
not achieve their intended purpose of requiring safe and adequate
transportation in the circumstances of this case. But the failure
of the regulatory procedures to achieve their purpose does not
mandate a conclusion that these defendants failed to carry out
a regulatory duty for which they may be subject to liability
under Gomez v. Florida State Employment Service, 417 F.2d
569 (5th Cir. 1969)]. As the district court correctly concluded,
the duty to check the adequacy of the transportation used by
crewleaders fell to others under the regulatory scheme in force
at the time of these events. In all likelihood, however, the real
failure was inherent in the regulatory scheme itself. 26
If Judge Tate had been a true believer in unrestrained judicial
legislation, he could have found upon the facts of Ramirez a sound
basis for imposing liability upon the defendants. As his opinion dem-
onstrated, he was certainly offended by the harm endured by the plain-
tiffs and their families:
The events giving rise to this litigation present a vivid picture
of how an expensive and complex bureaucratic web of agencies
can fall short of their intended purpose, and, in the process,
leave their alleged beneficiaries-often persons without the re-
sources to help themselves-unprotected from those who would
exploit them. 27
Nonetheless, the faithful application of existing precedent, as well as
statutory and regulatory authority, did not permit extension of liability
to the defendants. Consistent with his judicial philosophy, therefore,
Judge Tate could not and did not resort to policy considerations when
deciding this appeal and instead correctly denied relief to the plaintiffs.
The Ramirez case provides only a single example of the many cases
in which Judge Tate decided a dispute based upon precedent and other
existing authority rather than upon policy considerations that he con-
26. 736 F.2d at 172-73.
27. Id. at 169.
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sidered deserving or correct. 2 As his judicial philosophy suggests, Judge
Tate was strictly of the view that a judge writing an opinion for the
court was duty bound to present the court's opinion and not his own.
Judge Tate's strict adherence to this view is best exemplified by his
unique, and theoretically consistent, practice of dissenting from his own
opinions in certain cases.
In Linsteadt v. IRS,29 Judge Tate drafted the opinion of the court
and set forth the majority's finding that the district court had not erred
in finding that the IRS properly refused to release certain documents
to a taxpayer. After writing for the court and expressing the majority's
view, Judge Tate then dissented from his own opinion to express his
view that the IRS could not justify withholding the documents requested
by the taxpayers.30 Although this practice is curious, it follows from
Judge Tate's position that the first duty of any judge is to decide
disputes before the court in accordance with established authorities. If,
after performing that function, a judge wishes to act as jurist to express
a different view, he may do so, but only with a clear expression that
the views offered are not those of the court.
As the preceding discussion illustrates, Judge Tate was a man of
strong convictions with a true concern for the rights and well-being of
the common man. His motivations were often akin to those of the now
proverbial barber in Ville Platte rather than to those of larger entities
and interest groups. His judicial philosophy, however, required that he
express his beliefs only in cases where policy considerations were ap-
propriate. In this manner, Judge Tate was true to his duty as a judge
and jurist as well as to his devotion to the rights of the common citizen.
III. CONTRIBUTIONS TO LOUISIANA LAW
While serving on the Fifth Circuit, Judge Tate followed very closely
all developments in Louisiana law. As a Fifth Circuit judge, however,
he had little opportunity to make significant contributions to Louisiana
28. See also, e.g., Shawgo v. Spradlin, 701 F.2d 470, 478 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 965, 104 S. Ct. 404 (1983) (finding that a plaintiff's due process claim did not
have merit, but commenting that the plaintiff's demotion did "not seem 'fair' to us as
judges"); Montgomery v. Boshears, 698 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1983) (applying precedent to
find that the nonrenewal of a non-tenured employee's contract did not offend procedural
due process or First Amendment principles and that summary judgment was therefore
appropriate); and Wilson v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 228 So. 2d 229, 232 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1969) (reversing a trial court decision favoring the plaintiff and enforcing a
settlement and release obtained by the defendant, "despite . . . reasons which indicate
that the plaintiff ... had no bargaining power to resist the defendant's offer and was
instead under strong economic duress to accept it").
29. 729 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1984).
30. Id. at 1005 (Tate, J., dissenting).
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law. His Fifth Circuit decisions on questions involving Louisiana law
are mere persuasive authority for and need not be followed by Louisiana
courts. Further, acting as a Fifth Circuit judge, he was no longer free
(even if only in theory) pursuant to civilian methodology to regard state
court precedents as merely non-binding interpretations of issues arising
in disputes governed by Louisiana law." Rather, he was bound as a
federal judge to follow Louisiana jurisprudential interpretations of issues
governed by Louisiana law.32 Judge Tate's willingness to use the cert-
ification procedure to the Louisiana Supreme Court on questions of
Louisiana law as to which there was no clear controlling precedent
virtually precluded him from any opportunity to use his vast knowledge
to decide any important issues of Louisiana law arising in the Fifth
Circuit.
An excellent example of the judicial restraint practiced by Judge
Tate while on the Fifth Circuit may be found in Tessier v. H. S.
Anderson Trucking Co.," in which the plaintiff-wife in a Louisiana
diversity case sought recovery of damages for loss of consortium resulting
from a non-fatal injury to her husband. Louisiana courts, "in deference
to early high-court precedent," had consistently refused to recognize
such a cause of action, and based upon that authority, the United States
District Court had dismissed the plaintiff's suit for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted.3 4 The plaintiff contended on
appeal, however, that such a cause of action had always existed under
a proper interpretation of Civil Code articles 2315 and 1934(3), and that
a subsequent amendment to article 2315 specifically authorizing recovery
for such loss was merely intended to remove the bar to recovery that
had been judicially created (in error), rather than intended to create a
cause of action where none had existed before. The plaintiff urged that
the Louisiana decisions on point were in error and that therefore civilian
methodology commanded a different result than had been reached by
the Louisiana courts and by the district court.
Judge Tate, writing for the court in Tessier, found the plaintiff's
contentions to be "imaginative and persuasive." 3 5 Nonetheless, he noted
that the court was "Erie-bound to follow Louisiana jurisprudential inter-
pretations as they are, not as academic scholars say they should have
been." '3 6 There being no controlling Louisiana law to the contrary, the
court upheld the district court's dismissal of the suit.
31. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
32. C. Wright, Handbook of the Law of the Federal Courts § 58 (3d ed. 1976).
33. 713 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1983).





In Tessier, we see an example of Judge Tate having been restrained
by Erie from acting to right what he may have perceived as a misin-
terpretation of Louisiana law. In Perkins v. F.LE. Corp. , 7 we see an
example of Judge Tate certifying to the Louisiana Supreme Court ques-
tions he was no doubt eminently qualified to decide. At issue in Perkins
were, inter alia, questions of (a) whether the manufacture, sale, and
marketing of handguns constituted an ultrahazardous activity giving rise
to absolute or strict liability of the manufacturer, and (b) whether a
handgun constituted an unreasonably dangerous product when marketed
to the general public giving rise to strict liability of the manufacturer.
These issues arose in the context of whether an innocent victim of a
shooting can recover damages from the manufacturer of the handgun
used in the shooting based upon absolute or strict liability principles of
Louisiana law.
There being no controlling precedent in Perkins, Judge Tate's judicial
philosophy would have permitted the use of policy considerations to
decide the case. Having authored several important decisions regarding
strict liability and products liability while serving in the Louisiana ap-
pellate court system, Judge Tate was well acquainted with the policy
considerations bearing upon the issues certified in Perkins to the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court. These were important issues that he would have
been honored to have had the opportunity to decide. Nonetheless, we
see yet another example of Judge Tate exercising restraint as a federal
judge by deferring to interpretations of Louisiana law by Louisiana
judges.
In any event, Judge Tate's influence on the development of Louis-
iana law as a Fifth Circuit judge was far more limited than was
the case during his service as a Louisiana appellate court judge.
Nonetheless, Judge Tate authored several opinions covering a broad
range of issues of Louisiana law while on the Fifth Circuit, which
issues relate to3s prescription,39 conflict of laws,"' election of
37. 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985).
38. The following list is not intended to be exhaustive.
39. Driscoll v. N.O. Steamboat Co., 633 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1981) (United States
District Court for the Southern District of California found to be a "competent" court,
within meaning of La. R.S. 9:5801, where venue was proper and court had subject matter
jurisdiction, even though personal jurisdiction over the defendant was lacking); Billiot v.
American Hosp. Supply Corp., 721 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1983) (timely suit against manu-
facturer of prosthesis held to toll prescription under La. R.S. 9:5628 as to claim against
surgeon allegedly solidarily liable with manufacturer).
40. Bell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 680 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1982) (Louisiana
law found applicable to uninsured motorist provision of an automobile insurance policy
issued in Florida to a Florida resident on a vehicle licensed in Florida where the accident
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remedies, '4 1 strict liability,42 private disability pension plan,"3 contra non
valentem," and insurance."' It is evident from these decisions that
while on the Fifth Circuit Judge Tate was not afforded the opportunities
he enjoyed as a Louisiana appellate court judge to contribute to the
development of Louisiana law.
IV. CONCLUSION
We hope that our small insights as privileged witnesses into the
principles and ideas that motivated Judge Tate will give a sense of a
man who served his community tirelessly and won the respect of his
colleagues and the legal profession and will provide those who read this
in years to come with some rough conception of the elements that made
him a truly remarkable judge. The miracle of Judge Tate was the ease
with which he combined the role of judge, jurist or visionary of the
thoughts of the barber in Ville Platte to achieve fairness and justice in
the judicial process and the individual case. His legacy to us is a model
of excellence in public service as a judicial officer.
occurred in Louisiana, the victim was from Louisiana, and the insured and the vehicle
were both temporarily residing in Louisiana).
41. Intercontinental Eng'g-Mfg. Corp. v. C. F. Bean Corp., 647 F.2d 621 (5th Cir.
1981) (held that plaintiff may sue both the agent and his undisclosed principal in a single
suit in order to obtain a judgment binding them in solido, even where a plaintiff seeks
to recover in the alternative from an agent or his undisclosed principal cannot obtain the
same judgment against both).
42. Matthews v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 703 F.2d 921 (5th Cir. 1983) (disputed factual
issue found as to whether unreasonable risk of harm under negligence or strict liability
theories in placing an empty propane gas cylinder for filling adjacent to an electronically
cooled water cooler).
43. Glover v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 644 F. 2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1981) (determination
of committee administering a private pension plan is conclusive so long as the evidence
before the committee was sufficient and the committee's action was not arbitrary, ca-
pricious, or in bad faith).
44. American Cyanamid Co. v. Electrical Indus., Inc., 630 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1980)
(Louisiana doctrine applied where facts supported district court finding).
45. Jasmin v. Dumas, 769 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1985) (passenger entitled to elect to
recover from applicable uninsured motorist policies the highest average).

